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Most standard macro models of the open economy, such as the textbook IS-LM-
BP model, treat ￿nancial markets and international capital mobility as perfect.
In that world, only expectations of future returns, properly arbitraged, guide
capital ￿ows and investment; corporate balance sheets and current output levels
are irrelevant.
There are many reasons to be doubtful about this approach. Much recent
research provides reasons to believe that sovereign risk, limited and costly moni-
toring, and imperfect contract enforceability, render international capital markets
particularly prone to failure, in the sense that agents cannot borrow all they want
at the world rate of interest, limited only by intertemporal solvency constraints.
The problem is compounded by original sin, which prevents almost all emerging
countries from borrowing in their own currencies. This leaves them exposed to
currency and relative price risk, making repayment even dicier.
Policy makers fret a great deal over the potentially harmful balance sheet ef-
fects of devaluation. They were the main reason why Argentina delayed changes in
its peg ￿despite massive overvaluation and a deepening recession￿ until the econ-
omy collapsed along with the currency board. Similar concerns have been voiced
2in Uruguay and in less-dollarized Brazil. Allegedly, IS-LM-BP works diﬀerently
in the pampas of these three countries, and in others like them.
We have developed several models of the open economy that embed ￿nancial
market imperfections in otherwise standard optimizing dynamic models. Here we
present a particularly simple one, a variant of the textbook IS-LM-BP model.
Though it has a simple graphical representation, this model permits us to pose a
richer array of questions, and obtain more nuanced answers, than does the tradi-
tional perfect-capital-mobility approach. In fact, the standard model is simply a
special case of our more general framework.
Capital market imperfections and balance sheet eﬀects matter in two senses.
First, they magnify the domestic real eﬀects of adverse external shocks, such as
a fall in export volumes or an increase in the world real interest rate. Second,
devaluation may be expansionary (as in the standard model) or contractionary.
The second result requires particularly strong balance sheet eﬀects, arising from
both high sensitivity of risk premia and large inherited dollar debts. Then, and
only then, does IS-LM-BP turn out to operate diﬀerently in the pampas.
32. The Model
Monopolistically competitive ￿rms in the home economy produce diﬀerentiated
goods using labor and capital. These goods are exported or sold to domestic
agents. There is also a foreign good, which can be imported. Capital is made up
of the domestic and foreign goods, with Cobb-Douglas shares γ and 1 − γ,a n d
depreciates fully after one period. Prices and wages are pre-set for one period,
but free to adjust thereafter.
Labor and capital are supplied by distinct agents called workers and entre-
preneurs. Workers work and consume an aggregate of the domestic and foreign
good.1 Entrepreneurs own capital, and also own the ￿rms. In order to ￿nance
investment in excess of their own net worth, entrepreneurs borrow from the world
capital market. As in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), the cost of borrowing depends
inversely on net worth relative to the amount borrowed.
In what follows all variables are in percentage deviation from the no-shock
steady state.2 Start with the IS, which is standard:
y = αii + αxx + αee (2.1)
1With Cobb-Douglas shares γ and 1 − γ.
2Except for the world interest rate and the risk premium, which are just deviations (not
percentage deviations) from the steady state.
4where y is output of the domestically produced good, i is investment, x is the
dollar value of exports and e is the real exchange rate (the value of the foreign
goods in terms of the domestic good), The α￿s are positive coeﬃcients, which in
turn are combinations of the underlying preference and technology parameters of
the model (see the appendix for details). Under our assumptions, x is exogenously
given, while e is endogenous (or at least in￿uenced by monetary policy when prices
are sticky). For a given e, the IS schedule slopes up in (i,y) space.
Consider next the LM, which can be written as
m = βyy + βee − βii (2.2)
where m is the value of money in terms of the domestic good, βy and βi are
positive coeﬃcients (all functions of underlying structural parameters), and βe
may be positive or negative depending on whether the elasticity of money demand
with respect to consumption expenditures is larger or smaller than one.3 The real
exchange rate enters money demand because it is the value of monetary balances
in terms of consumption that matters to the agents who hold it, and they consume
both the foreign and the domestic good. Hence, a change in relative prices (a move
3If this elasticity is smaller than one, then βe is positive, and viceversa. If it is exactly one,
then βe =0 .
5in e) alters the home good value of consumption, and changes money demand as
well. The reason why money demand falls with investment is as follows: Holding
other factors constant, money demand today depends inversely on consumption
tomorrow (recall the standard Euler relationship), and consumption tomorrow is
increasing in investment today.
Turn next to the BP. It contains the non-standard features of the model, so
we derive it in more detail. Begin with the investment demand equation
i = −(ρ + η)+γe (2.3)
where ρ is the world rate of interest and η the country risk premium (both in units
of the foreign good). This relationship can easily be derived from the standard
rate of return international arbitrage equation (see the appendix for details). As it
stands, it has a simple intuition: investment is decreasing in the relevant interna-
tional cost of capital (recall entrepreneurs borrow abroad to ￿nance investment)
and increasing in the current real exchange rate ￿because, ceteris paribus,ah i g h e r
e today means a lower expected real depreciation between today and tomorrow,
and hence a lower cost of foreign capital, when measured in terms of the domestic
good.
6Crucially, the risk premium is endogenously determined and given by
η = ￿[(1 − γ)e + i − n] (2.4)
where n is entrepreneurs￿ net worth (in units of the domestic good) and ￿ is a
positive coeﬃcient. Intuitively, the risk premium increases when the value of cur-
rent investment is high (we can think of (1 − γ)e as the price of the investment
good in terms of the home good) and decreases with net worth. For a derivation
of this relationship from an underlying contract environment with imperfect infor-
mation and costly monitoring, see CØspedes, Chang and Velasco (2001). Notice
that capital markets are perfect if ￿ =0 .
Finally, net worth is given by
n = δyy − δee (2.5)
where both δ￿s are positive coeﬃcients that increase with the initial stock of
dollar liabilities relative to initial net worth. An increase in output raises the
income of capitalists and therefore increases net worth. A depreciation of the
(real) exchange rate increases the output value of debt repayments, because of
dollarization of liabilities, and reduces net worth.
7Substituting 2.5 into 2.4 we have
η = ￿[(1 − γ + δe)e + i − δyy] (2.6)
so that the risk premium unambiguously increases with e and i and decreases with

















Quite naturally, investment is decreasing in the world rate of interest. The other
two terms are more novel. Investment increases with output only if capital markets
are imperfect (￿>0), since higher output increases net worth and reduces the risk
premium. Hence the BP curve slopes up in (i,y) space for a given real exchange
rate and shock to the world interest rate. If ￿ =0 ,t h eB Pi sh o r i z o n t a l .
Notice also that investment may be increasing or decreasing in the real ex-
change rate. Standard arbitrage forces described above push for an increasing
relationship: a higher e makes borrowing abroad cheaper. But the balance sheet
eﬀect pushes in the opposite direction: a higher e means a higher value of debt
payments, and hence lower net worth and higher risk premia. Notice the balance
8sheet eﬀect prevails when capital market imperfections are high (large ￿)a n d
when the initial stock of dollar debt is high (large δe). If the coeﬃcient on e is
positive, we have a ￿nancially vulnerable economy.I ft h ec o e ﬃcient is negative,
we have a ￿nancially robust economy. The size of balance sheets eﬀects also mat-
ter for the slope of the BP curve. The stronger the balance sheet eﬀects (the
larger are ￿ and δy), the larger the slope of the BP curve.
We solve the model diagrammatically under the regime of ￿xed (but ad-
justable) exchange rates. Because the home currency price is predetermined,
a ￿xed nominal exchange rate makes the relative price e also predetermined. For
ag i v e ne, the intersection of the IS and BP curves pins down investment and
output.4 In turn, the LM yields the level of the money supply necessary for that
particular equilibrium to obtain.5
4We consider only the case in which the slope of the IS is larger that the slope of the BP.
The opposite case is empirically odd, since it implies that an increase in the world interest rate
or a fall in exports leads the economy to a boom in production and investment.
5Recall these are percentage deviations from the no-shock steady state, holding prices and
wages constant. Without nominal stickiness, ouput is exogenous (pinned down by the inherited
capital stock and by equilibrim labor supply l =0 ), the IS and BP pin down the equilibrium
real exchange rate for a given output level, and the LM only determines the price level.
93. Eﬀects of external and policy shocks
Consider ￿rst the eﬀects of a fall in current exports, depicted in ￿gure 1.T h e
shock shifts the IS up and to the left, so that for each level of investment there
is now a smaller corresponding output level. The new intersection is at point A,
with lower investment and output than in the steady state. The output fall is as
in the standard model with perfect capital markets and no balance sheet eﬀects,
but the fall in investment is not. In that model, a fall in exports today does
not aﬀect the pro￿tability of capital tomorrow, and hence it leaves investment
unchanged. That is what happens in our model in the special case ￿ =0 ,s ot h a t
the BP curve is horizontal. Notice that with stronger balance sheet eﬀects (larger
￿ and δy) the BP becomes steeper, and magnifying the adverse eﬀects on both
investment and output.
Consider next the eﬀects of a one-period increase in the world rate of interest.
In ￿gure 2, the shock shifts the BP down and to the right, so that investment is
lower for each output level. The result is lower investment and output, as in point
A. This is qualitatively as it would be in the standard model with perfect capital
markets and a horizontal BP curve, but quantitatively there is a diﬀerence: for the
same downward shift, the steeper the BP the larger the reduction in investment
10and output. The capital market imperfections and resulting balance sheet eﬀects
magni￿es the real eﬀects of adverse interest rate shocks.6
Can monetary policy play a countercyclical role? To answer that question
we look at the impact of a real depreciation, accommodated by monetary policy.
Start with a ￿nancially robust economy. This is the case in which initial dollar
debt is low with respect to net worth and the elasticity of the risk premium with
respect to the ratio of investment spending to net worth is also low. A depreciation
of the real exchange rate shifts the IS down and the BP up. This situation appears
in ￿gure 3. Both output and investment unambiguously go up. This is just as
in the standard model: real depreciation is expansionary, and it can be used to
oﬀset the real eﬀects of adverse shocks.7
Turn next to the ￿nancially vulnerable economy. This is the case in which
balance sheets eﬀects are strong, i.e., the initial level of debt is high and the
elasticity ￿ is also high. Figure 4 illustrates the three possible situations. The IS
still shifts down, but now the BP shifts down as well. The economy may settle
in a point like A with higher output and investment (this is an economy that is
6T h es a m ei st r u eo fe x p o r ts h o c k s .
7Notice that the presence of ￿nancial imperfections has ambiguous eﬀects on the size of the
expansion. On the one hand, having ￿>0 and δe large reduces the size of the vertical shift
in the BP; on the other hand, a large ￿ increases the slope of the BP, which magni￿es the
equilibrium impact of any depreciation.
11vulnerable but not too much so); a point like B where there is a trade-oﬀ between
investment and output; and a case like C where both output and investment
decline. The last one is the case of unambiguously contractionary devaluation,
and trying to use exchange rate and monetary policy for counter-cyclical purposes
can only make matters worse.
The intuition of why devaluation can be contractionary is simple: with im-
perfect capital markets, balance sheets matter; if there are enough inherited dol-
lar liabilities, the real depreciation worsens the balance sheet and increases the
risk premium; in turn, this pulls down investment and aggregate demand; if the
standard demand-switching eﬀects of devaluation are not suﬃciently strong, the
overall impact can be contractionary.
Again, notice that none of this could happen with perfect capital markets. In
that case the BP is horizontal and shifts up after a real devaluation. The only
possible outcome is an increase in both investment and output.
4. Conclusions
The analysis suggests that the currently fashionable conclusion that liability dol-
larization renders monetary policy useless, and fully justi￿es ￿fear of ￿oating,￿
is much too simple. When balance sheet eﬀects are not too strong, the model
12behaves qualitatively just like the standard one, though quantitatively the capi-
tal market imperfections magnify the eﬀects of adverse external shocks. In that
case, monetary and exchange rate policy have the same eﬀects as in the textbook
example.
With very imperfect international ￿nancial markets and large inherited dollar
debts, matters are diﬀerent. An unexpected real devaluation can depress both
investment and output, justifying policymakers￿ fears. The task ahead is to sort
out when and how these circumstances arise. In previous work we have found that
it takes unrealistically high steady state debt ratios and risk premia to generate
the contractionary case, but researchers using more disaggregated models and
alternative distributions for shocks may come to diﬀerent conclusions.8 Putting
imperfect credibility into the picture is also important: it is in short supply in
the pampas, and it crucially aﬀects the bene￿cial results of devaluation. Again,
in a previous paper we found that imperfect credibility, even in the presence of
balance sheet eﬀects, does not overturn received wisdom on the desirability of
￿exible exchange rates and countercyclical monetary policy.9 But the issue surely
remains open.
8See CØspedes, Chang and Velasco (2001).
9See CØspedes, Chang and Velasco (2002).
13A. Appendix
For simplicity we assume only two periods, t =0 ,1, and focus on the eﬀect of
shocks only at the start of period 0.
A.1. Domestic Production
Production of each variety of domestic goods is carried out by a continuum of ￿rms






jt , 0 < α < 1 (A.1)
where Yjt denotes output of variety j in period t, Kjt denotes capital input and
Ljt denotes labor input. Assume that workers￿ labor services are heterogeneous.











where workers are indexed by i in the unit interval, Lijt denotes the services
purchased from worker i by ￿rm j,a n dσ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution









which can be taken to be the aggregate nominal wage. The jth ￿rm￿s maximizes
expected pro￿ts in every period. Pro￿ts are given by
Πjt = PjtYjt −
Z 1
0
WijtLijt di − RtKjt (A.4)
where Rt is the return to capital, and pro￿ts are expressed in terms of the domestic
currency (henceforth called peso), subject to the production function in A.1 and











t must be understood to include demand from domestic consumers and




















Finally, ￿rms will set prices for its diﬀerentiated product as a constant markup
over marginal cost. In the symmetric monopolistic competitive equilibrium, prices












There is a continuum of workers, whose total ￿number￿ is normalized to one. The
representative worker has preferences over consumption, labor supply, and real






























t denotes purchases of a basket of the diﬀerent varieties of goods produced
domestically, CF
t purchases of the imported good, and κ =[ γγ (1 − γ)
1−γ]−1 is an
irrelevant constant. Assume that domestically produced goods are aggregated











, θ > 1, (A.12)
Assume also that the imported good has a ￿xed price, normalized to one, in
terms of a foreign currency, which we shall refer to as the dollar. Also, we assume
that imports are freely traded and that the Law of One Price holds, so that the
peso price of imports is equal to the nominal exchange rate of St pesos per dollar.
Assume also that the only asset that workers can hold is money. Then, in





it = WitLit + Tt − Mit + Mit−1 (A.13)
















Fiscal policy is as simple as can be: in￿ation tax revenues are rebated to
workers through lump sum transfers. Then,
Mt − Mt−1 = Tt (A.16)
where Mt =
R 1
0 Mit di. This assumption ensures that, in the symmetric equilib-
rium, workers consume their nominal income:
QtCt = WtLt (A.17)













where absence of the subscript i indicates that we have imposed symmetry in
equilibrium. Additionally, we have de￿ned Et as the price of foreign goods in
terms of domestic goods, or the real exchange rate.
Each worker will optimally supply labor to equate his marginal disutility of





Now adopt the convention that no subscript indicates an initial period variable,
while a subscript 1 indicates a ￿nal period variable. Money demands in periods 0























Entrepreneurs borrow from abroad in order to ￿nance investment. They do it us-
ing dollar denominated debt contracts which, due to imperfections in the ￿nancial
markets, require paying a risk premium over the risk free interest rate. Assume
that entrepreneurs start with some inhered debt repayments, due at the end of the
period, equal to D in dollars. They also they own a quantity K of capital which
is used to produce the home good in period 0. After debt repayments, these en-
trepreneurs borrow from the world capital market in order to ￿nance investment
in excess of their own net worth.
Investment becomes capital next period and is produced by combining home
goods and imports. For simplicity, we assume that capital is produced in the same
f a s h i o na si nA . 11. Therefore, the cost of producing one unit of capital available
in period 1 is Q. The entrepreneurs￿ budget constraint in period 0 is
PN+ SD1 = QI (A.22)
where N represents net worth, D1 denotes the amount borrowed abroad in period
0a n dI = K1 investment in period 1 capital.
Net worth plays a crucial role because the interest cost of borrowing abroad is
20not simply the world safe rate ρ. Entrepreneurs borrow abroad paying a premium,
η, above this risk free interest rate. We assume that the risk premium is an
increasing function in the ratio of the value of investment to net worth as in
Bernanke and Gertler (1989). In particular, we assume the following functional






We assume that capital depreciates completely in production. In equilibrium,








Given that entrepreneurs own local ￿rms, the income that they receive is
not only the payment to capital. They also receive the pro￿ts associated to the
monopolistic power that each ￿rm has. Entrepreneurs￿ net worth is
PN = RK + Π − SD = PY − WL− SD (A.25)
21where Π re￿ects pro￿ts from the ￿rms in pesos.
A.4. Equilibrium
Market clearing for the home goods require that domestic output be equal to





(I + C)+EX (A.26)
Notice the term EX stands for the home good value of exports to the rest of the
world, where X is exogenous.10
Given that period 1 is the ￿nal period, there is no investment on it. Assuming
that entrepreneurs consume only foreign goods, the market clearing condition for
the second period is
P1Y1 = γQ1C1 + E1P1X1 (A.27)
This last equation can be simpli￿ed further, since workers consume all their
income each period:
10This is similar to Krugman (1999), and can be justi￿ed by positing that the foreign elasticity
of substitution across goods in consumption is one, and that the share of domestic goods in
foreigners￿ expenditure is negligible. This last fact allows us to treat X as exogenous.
22Y1 = τE1X1 (A.28)
where τ =
h







The next step consists in obtaining log-linear approximations around the equilib-
rium with no shocks. Start by noticing that A.15 implies
qt − pt =( 1− γ)(st − pt)=( 1− γ)et (A.29)
in both periods. Next derive equilibrium relations in period 1.T h e￿rst relation
is the log-linear version of equation A.17
q1 + c1 = w1 + l1 (A.30)
Equation A.9 shows that wage income in period 1 i saf r a c t i o no ft h et o t a lr e v e n u e .
Therefore,
p1 + y1 = w1 + l1 (A.31)
23Combining these last three equations we obtain that
c1 = y1 − (q1 − p1)=y1 − (1 − γ)e1 (A.32)
Assuming no export shocks in period 1, the log-linear version of the market clear-
ing condition for period 1 is
y1 = e1 (A.33)
Using these two equations together we obtain c1 = γe1. Now, since under no
shocks labor supply is ￿xed at one (recall the ￿rst order condition for labor sup-
ply), we have y1 = αi. Combining this with A.33 we have
αi = e1 (A.34)
Pulling together these results we arrive at
c1 = γαi (A.35)
We can now solve the model in the initial period. The log-linear version of the
resource constraint in period 0 is
24τy +( 1− τ)(q + c)=λ(q + i)+( 1− λ)(e + x) (A.36)
where λ =
ﬂ QI
ﬂ QI+ ﬂ E ﬂ X < 1 and where, without loss of generality, we have set p =0 .
Given that capital is a pre-determined variable in period 0, deviations of output
from its no-shock equilibrium will be matched by changes in labor only:
y =( 1− α)l (A.37)
Log-linearizing equation A.17w eh a v e
q + c = l, (A.38)
since the nominal wage is pre-set. Combining these last two equations we have
that













[λi +( 1− γλ)e +( 1− λ)x], (A.40)
which is equation 2.1 in the text.
Now focus on the money market. Log-linearize money demand in each period,
given by equations A.20 and A.21, which yields
ε(m1 − q1)=c1 (A.41)
εω(m − q)+( 1− ω)(c1 + q1 − q)=c (A.42)
where ω =1− β
Q ﬂ C
ﬂ Q1 ﬂ C1. Note that ω is between 0 and 1 as long as the growth of
nominal consumption is not too negative, which we assume from now on. Notice
that ε−1 can be interpreted as the elasticity of money demand with respect to con-
sumption expenditures. Using A.35 and A.39 to substitute out the consumptions,
















which is equation 2.2 in the text.
26The ￿nal block of equations to be solved is the one associated with the entre-
preneurs. The log-linear version of the arbitrage relation (equation A.24) is
(r1 − p1) − q = ρ + η + e1 − s (A.44)
while the log-linear version of A.8 is r1 − p1 = −i(1 − α). Using this, A.29 and
A.34 we have
i = −(ρ + η)+γe (A.45)
which is 2.3 in the text. The log-linear version of the equation for the risk premium
(A.23) is
η = ￿(q + i − n) (A.46)










(1 + ψ)y − ψe (A.47)
where ψ = ED
N > 0. This is 2.5 in the text. Note that when ψ is large, initial debt
is also large relative to net worth.
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Figure 3: devaluation in  
financially robust economy 
   
 











Figure 4: devaluation in 
financially vulnerable economy 
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